MANILA, Philippines—It is called “Party List” because voters choose from a list of political parties instead of individual candidates. These parties represent different sectors or advocacies, and the seats they get in Congress are based on the percentage of votes they receive. So, instead of electing a single person, you’re voting for a party from a list. Hence, “party list.”

As they say, IYKYK what this table is.

Election Year (President) No. of Congressmen Party-List (Districts) Total Seats Won Cooperative-Oriented Groups Elected Votes Received % of Votes Cast Seats Won Notes
1998 (Estrada, elected) 52 (206) 14 APEC, NATCCO 503,487, 189,802 5.50%, 2.07% 2, 1 N/A
2001 (Arroyo, sworn in) 52 (209) 16 APEC 802,060 12.30% 3 NATCCO (Disqualified)
2004 (Arroyo, elected) 53 (209) 24 APEC, NATCCO 934,995, 270,950 7.35%, 2.13% 3, 1 N/A
2007 (Arroyo) 53 (218) 53 APEC, NATCCO, AGAP 619,733, 409,987, 328,814 3.87%, 2.56%, 2.05% 2, 2, 2 N/A
2010 (Aquino III, elected) 57 (253) 57 NATCCO, AGAP, APEC 944,864, 516,052, 313,689 3.14%, 1.71%, 1.04% 2, 1, 1 APSG participated but did not win (15,595 votes, 0.05%)
2013 (Aquino III) 58 (238) 58 NATCCO, AGAP 642,005, 592,463 2.32%, 2.14% 2, 2 APEC participated but did not win (146,392 votes, 0.53%)
2016 (Duterte, elected) 59 (238) 59 NATCCO, AGAP 671,699, 593,748 2.07%, 1.83% 2, 1 Ating Koop participated but did not win (120,361 votes, 0.37%)
2019 (Duterte) 61 (243) 61 NATCCO, APEC, AGAP 417,285, 480,874, 208,752 1.50%, 1.72%, 0.75% 1, 1, 1 Ating Koop participated but did not win (131,344 votes, 0.47%)
2022 (Marcos Jr., elected) 61 (253) 61 NATCCO, APEC, PHILRECA 346,341, 341,068, 831,706 1.59%, 1.78%, 2.38% 1, 1, 2 KKMP participated but did not win (114,587 votes, 0.31%), One Coop participated but did not win (64,627 votes, 0.18%)
2025 (Marcos Jr.) 63 (254) 63 To be determined To be determined To be determined To be determined Confirmed participants: APEC, AGAP, PHILRECA, NATCCO, One Coop

Footnotes:
APSG: Alliance for Philippines Security Guards Cooperative
Ating Koop: Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba
KKMP: Kooperatiba-Kapisanan ng Magsasaka ng Pilipinas


The party-list system is a mechanism for broadening democratic participation and ensuring legislative representation for marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Established after the 1986 People Power Revolution, this system allocates 20% of seats in the House of Representatives to sectoral groups, including laborers, peasants, indigenous communities, and women (CIDS; FES Philippines). Inspired by proportional representation models, it operates alongside district-based elections to counterbalance traditional political elites (Wikipedia; Brisbane).

Pre-1987

Prior to the 1987 Constitution, Philippine politics operated under a two-party system dominated by the Nacionalista and Liberal Parties (FES Philippines). There were no formal channels for marginalized groups to secure representation. However, from 1972–1986, the Batasang Pambansa introduced appointed sectoral representatives (Brisbane). The 1986 Constitutional Commission viewed a party-list system as essential for integrating grassroots voices into governance (CIDS).

1987

Article VI, Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution institutionalized the party-list system, reserving 20% of House seats for representatives from labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous, and other marginalized sectors (Wikipedia). The framers assumed the system would eventually function within a parliamentary framework (FES Philippines).

1995

The Party-List System Act (Rep. Act No. 7941) operationalized the constitutional mandate by defining eligibility criteria, registration processes, and seat allocation mechanisms. It reserved the system for marginalized sectors (Wikipedia). However, vague definitions of “marginalized” and “underrepresented” led to early controversies (Kasarinlan).

2000

The case of Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC established the 2% vote threshold for seat eligibility, initially limiting smaller parties’ access. Critics argued this undermined proportional representation by allowing larger groups to monopolize seats (CIDS).

2001

The Court Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC clarified that only genuine marginalized groups could participate, barring major political parties from exploiting the system. This ruling emphasized the system’s original intent but struggled with enforcement (FES Philippines).

Among those recommended for disqualification was the Cooperative NATCCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), as it did not meet the criteria set for marginalized and underrepresented sectors. In subsequent elections, after addressing the issues highlighted in the disqualification, COOP-NATCCO successfully registered again and participated in the party-list system, securing seats in the House of Representatives to represent the interests of cooperatives nationwide.

2009

Declaring the 2% threshold unconstitutional, the decision in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC introduced a proportional allocation formula, enabling more parties to secure seats. However, the three-seat cap per party established by Republic Act No. 7941 remained, preventing dominance by any single group (Wikipedia).


Illustration of the BANAT Decision

Given:

Let’s assume this scenario is real.

Total party-list votes 36,000,000
Total electoral turnout 55,000,000
Total party-list seats available 63
Total party-list groups 177
Minimum votes required for a guaranteed seat (2% rule) 720,000 votes
Hare quota (Total votes ÷ 63 seats) 571,428 votes per seat

Final Results

You can see the total party list seats won below. The (>2%) simply means the party list reached the 2% threshold.

How did this come about?

Party Name Total Seats
CoopParty A (>2%) 3
CoopParty B (>2%) 3
CoopParty C (>2%) 3
CoopParty D (>2%) 3
CoopParty E (>2%) 3
CoopParty F (>2%) 3
CoopParty G (>2%) 3
Other Party H (>2%) 2
Other Party I (>2%) 2
Other Party J (>2%) 2
Party K (<2%) 1
Party L (<2%) 1
Party M (<2%) 1
Party N (<2%) 1
Party O to Party AE (<2%) 17 parties 17
Party AF to Party AT (<2%) 15 parties 15
Party AU to Party JJ (<2%) 131 parties 0
Total 63

Let’s find out!

First Round:

In the first round, only parties that received at least 2% of the total party-list votes (720,000 votes) were guaranteed 1 seat. These parties include:

  • CoopParty A to G: Each received more than 2% of the votes, qualifying them for 1 seat each .
  • Other Party H to J: These parties also met the 2% threshold, earning them 1 seat each as well.

This resulted in a total of 10 seats being allocated in the first round (7+3=10).

Party Name First Round
CoopParty A (>2%) 1
CoopParty B (>2%) 1
CoopParty C (>2%) 1
CoopParty D (>2%) 1
CoopParty E (>2%) 1
CoopParty F (>2%) 1
CoopParty G (>2%) 1
Other Party H (>2%) 1
Other Party I (>2%) 1
Other Party J (>2%) 1
Party K (<2%) 0
Party L (<2%) 0
Party M (<2%) 0
Party N (<2%) 0
Party O to Party AE (<2%) 17 parties 0
Party AF to Party JJ (<2%) 146 parties 0
Total 10

Second Round:

After the first round, 53 seats remained to be distributed. These seats were allocated proportionally using the Hare quota formula:

R2​=(Remaining Seats)×(Party’s Vote Share)
  • CoopParty A to G: Each received 2 additional seats, bringing their total to 3 seats each (7×2=14).
  • Other Party H to J: Each received 1 additional seat, bringing their total to 2 seats each (3×1=3).

This resulted in a total of 17 seats being allocated in the second round (14+3=17).

Party Name First Round Second Round Total After Second Round
CoopParty A (>2%) 1 2 3
CoopParty B (>2%) 1 2 3
CoopParty C (>2%) 1 2 3
CoopParty D (>2%) 1 2 3
CoopParty E (>2%) 1 2 3
CoopParty F (>2%) 1 2 3
CoopParty G (>2%) 1 2 3
Other Party H (>2%) 1 1 2
Other Party I (>2%) 1 1 2
Other Party J (>2%) 1 1 2
Party K (<2%) 0 0 -
Party L (<2%) 0 0 -
Party M (<2%) 0 0 -
Party N (<2%) 0 0 -
Party O to Party AE (<2%) 17 parties 0 0 -
Party AF to Party JJ (<2%) 146 parties 0 0 -
Total 10 17 27
Basis and sample of computation

The actual votes and vote share can be seen in the table below. From the first round, CoopParty A got two additional seats in the second round because:

  • The total party-list seats available is 63. After the 10 of the first round, these 53 remaining seats are distributed proportionally in the second round based on each party’s vote share.
  • CoopParty A received a total of 2,500,000 votes out of 36,000,000 valid votes. To calculate CoopParty A’s vote share percentage, we divide the number of votes it received by the total valid votes and then multiply the result by 100. The calculation is as follows: (2,500,000 / 36,000,000) × 100 = 6.94%. This means that CoopParty A secured 6.94% of the total valid votes.
  • The number of seats allocated to CoopParty A in the second round is calculated using the formula R₂ = (Remaining Seats) × (Party’s Vote Share). To apply this formula, we substitute the values: the remaining seats are 53, and CoopParty A’s vote share is 6.94%, which is equivalent to 0.0694. By multiplying 53 by 0.0694, we get 3.68. This means that CoopParty A is allocated approximately 3.68 seats in the second round.
  • The result of 3.68 is rounded down to the nearest whole number, meaning CoopParty A is allocated 3 additional seats in the second round. Since CoopParty A already had 1 seat from the first round, their total becomes 1 + 3 = 4. However, according to the rules, no party can exceed 3 seats, so CoopParty A’s total is capped at 3 seats.
Party Name Total Seats Votes Vote Share (%)
CoopParty A (>2%) 3 2,500,000 6.94%
CoopParty B (>2%) 3 2,300,000 6.39%
CoopParty C (>2%) 3 2,200,000 6.11%
CoopParty D (>2%) 3 2,000,000 5.56%
CoopParty E (>2%) 3 1,800,000 5.00%
CoopParty F (>2%) 3 1,500,000 4.17%
CoopParty G (>2%) 3 1,400,000 3.89%
Other Party H (>2%) 2 1,200,000 3.33%
Other Party I (>2%) 2 1,000,000 2.78%
Other Party J (>2%) 2 900,000 2.50%
Party K (<2%) 1 600,000 1.67%
Party L (<2%) 1 500,000 1.39%
Party M (<2%) 1 400,000 1.11%
Party N (<2%) 1 300,000 0.83%
Party O to Party AE (<2%) 17 parties 17 10,200,000 28.33% (total)
Party AF to Party AT (<2%) 15 parties 15 7,500,000 20.83% (total)
Party AU to Party JJ (<2%) 131 parties 0 15,300,000 42.50% (total)

Final Adjustment:

After the second round, 36 seats remained to be distributed. These seats were allocated to parties with less than 2% of the votes to ensure all 63 seats were filled:

  • Party K to N : Each received 1 seat (4×1=4).
  • Party O to AE : Each of the 17 parties received 1 seat (17×1=17).
  • Party AF to AT : Each of the next 15 parties received 1 seat (15×1=15).

This resulted in a total of 36 seats being allocated in the final adjustment round (4+17+15=36).

Party Name First Round Second Round Final Adjustment Total Seats
CoopParty A (>2%) 1 2 0 3
CoopParty B (>2%) 1 2 0 3
CoopParty C (>2%) 1 2 0 3
CoopParty D (>2%) 1 2 0 3
CoopParty E (>2%) 1 2 0 3
CoopParty F (>2%) 1 2 0 3
CoopParty G (>2%) 1 2 0 3
Other Party H (>2%) 1 1 0 2
Other Party I (>2%) 1 1 0 2
Other Party J (>2%) 1 1 0 2
Party K (<2%) 0 0 1 1
Party L (<2%) 0 0 1 1
Party M (<2%) 0 0 1 1
Party N (<2%) 0 0 1 1
Party O to Party AE (<2%) 17 parties 0 0 17 17
Party AF to Party AT (<2%) 15 parties 0 0 15 15
Party AU to Party JJ (<2%) 131 parties 0 0 0 0
Total 10 17 36 63

Summary of Seat Allocation:

  • First Round: 10 seats allocated to parties meeting the 2% threshold.
  • Second Round: 17 seats allocated proportionally using the Hare quota.
  • Final Adjustment: 36 seats allocated to smaller parties to ensure full distribution.

The total number of seats allocated across all rounds is: 10 + 17 + 36 = 63 seats.​


NOTE: The Hare quota (571,428 votes per seat) provides a theoretical baseline for seat allocation. The 2% threshold rule modifies the Hare quota in the first round, requiring parties to exceed 720,000 votes to qualify for a seat. In the second round, the Hare quota guides the proportional distribution of remaining seats. The final adjustment phase ensures all 63 seats are allocated, even to smaller parties that don’t meet the Hare quota individually.


2013

Expanding eligibility, the Court permitted non-sectoral organizations to participate if they advocated for marginalized interests. In the 2013 case Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, the Philippine Supreme Court expanded the scope of the party-list system. The Court ruled that not only sectoral parties representing marginalized and underrepresented groups but also national and regional parties or organizations could participate in the party-list elections. This decision allowed political parties to field candidates through their sectoral wings, provided these wings registered separately under the party-list system. The intent was to broaden representation; however, this inclusivity inadvertently opened avenues for politicians to establish proxy parties, potentially diluting the system’s original purpose of amplifying marginalized voices. (Carnegie).


Origins

The term “party-list system” denotes an electoral framework where political parties—rather than individual candidates—compete for legislative seats allocated proportionally to their share of the national vote (Electoral Reform).

Originating in 19th-century Europe, this model emerged as a corrective to majoritarian systems that often marginalized minority viewpoints. Belgium’s adoption of list-based voting in 1899 and Sweden’s 1907 reforms pioneered proportional parliamentary representation, enabling multi-party democracies to balance regional and ideological diversity (Electoral Reform).

By the 21st century, over 80 countries employed some form of party-list mechanism, making it the world’s most prevalent electoral system (Wikipedia PR).

Closed-List Systems

Under closed-list arrangements, voters select a party rather than specific candidates, with seat allocations determined by predetermined candidate rankings set by party leaderships. This model, used in South Africa and Spain, strengthens party discipline but limits voter influence over individual representatives (Electoral Reform). For example, Spain’s lista cerrada system contributed to the consolidation of national parties like PSOE and PP while constraining regional movements (FES Philippines).

Open-List Systems

Open-list variants, implemented in Finland and Brazil, permit voters to prioritize candidates within party lists. In Brazil’s 2022 elections, over 40% of voters altered default candidate rankings, demonstrating increased electoral agency (Electoral Reform). However, this can fragment party cohesion, as seen in the Netherlands’ 2021 election where 17 parties entered parliament (Wikipedia PR).


References

  1. Brisbane
  2. Carnegie
  3. CIDS
  4. FES
  5. FES Philippines
  6. Kasarinlan
  7. Wikipedia Party-list
  8. East Asia Forum
  9. Electoral Reform
  10. SET Foundation
  11. Wikipedia
Share this post
The link has been copied!